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Nowadays in modern and ubiquitous computing environments, it is imperative more than ever the necessity for deployment
of pervasive healthcare architectures into which the patient is the central point surrounded by diﬀerent types of embedded
and small computing devices, which measure sensitive physical indications, interacting with hospitals databases, allowing thus
urgent medical response in occurrences of critical situations. Such environments must be developed satisfying the basic security
requirements for real-time secure data communication, and protection of sensitive medical data and measurements, data integrity
and conﬁdentiality, and protection of the monitored patient’s privacy. In this work, we argue that the MPEG-21 Intellectual
Property Management and Protection (IPMP) components can be used in order to achieve protection of transmitted medical
information and enhance patient’s privacy, since there is selective and controlled access to medical data that sent toward the
hospital’s servers.
Copyright © 2009 Anastasios Fragopoulos et al.ThisisanopenaccessarticledistributedundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1.Introduction
In modern computing era, health is an important aspect for
society since it involves every citizen. The current health care
system is designed to reward medical doctors and medical
institutions to treat people when they are sick, and not
acting proactively thus preventing them from being sick.
Recently, in many countries the health care system is subject
to reform since the rapidly growing populations of elderly
combined with the increasing cost of health care services
imposeseveralchallengesonhealthcareproviders,insurance
companies, hospitals, and even on patients. All these suggest
that ﬁrst of all healthcare needs a major shift toward a
more proactive direction focusing on prevention and/or
early detection of acute events and afterwards more scalable
and more aﬀordable solutions should be oﬀered. Therefore,
all the above-mentioned requirements have accentuated the
need for pervasive and ubiquitous embedded e-Health envi-
ronments, given that limited ﬁnancial and human resources
will be committed.
The modern backbone communication infrastructures,
networks, and technologies like GSM, UMTS, WCDMA,
WiMAX,Internet,Wireless,andBluetoothprotocolsprovide
extraordinary high data rates, thus allowing cost-eﬃcient
and time-eﬃcient remote delivering of medical data that
have been collected from the portable, embedded devices
that reside onto the end-users (monitored patients) toward
remoteMedicalServers,forfurtherprocessing.Furthermore,
the pervasiveness and ubiquitous character of modern user-
centric nomadic environments, in which the user is the
central point surrounded by diﬀerent types of embedded
and small computing devices, like, for example, electrocar-
diograph (ECG) and pulse, oxygen saturation, and blood
pressure sensors, add extra requirements concerning security
aspects such as the protection of sensitive medical data
and measurements, data integrity and conﬁdentiality, and
protection of patients privacy. In such environments, it
is imperative to design and deploy eﬃcient and eﬀective
network architectures as well as a generic, if possible,
communication interface targeted to connect the external
networks with the “smart” individual-person (equipped
with diﬀerent types of “smart” embedded medical devices
(EMDs)) satisfying the basic security requirements for
real-time, secure data communication, and protection of2 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
sensitive medical data and measurements, data integrity and
conﬁdentiality, and protection of the monitored patient’s
privacy.Thearchitecturesandtheinterfacemustconsiderthe
limited resources of the interconnected embedded systems,
especially in light of the signiﬁcant resources required for
implementing security, which, in general, are quite resource-
hungry leading thus to signiﬁcant technical problems.
MPEG-21 is a standard that deﬁnes mechanisms and
tools as means of sharing digital rights, permissions, and
restrictions for digital content from content creator to con-
tent consumer. It is an XML-based standard that is designed
to communicate machine-readable license information in
an ubiquitous, unambiguous, and secure manner between
peer entities. Although MPEG-21 is a standard that is used
for sharing multimedia digital content, under well-deﬁned
terms, we argue that it could be used for protection of
medical data and user’s privacy in a pervasive healthcare
environment,assumingthatthedigitalcontentisthemedical
data generated by the EMDs. The content creator is any
“user” under monitoring and the “end-user” is anyone
having access to a remote Medical Server located in a
hospital either being supervisors, trained medical stuﬀ,o r
doctors.
In our work, we propose a generic security framework
basedontheMPEG-21standardadoptedforwearableEMDs
thus ﬁlling an existing gap which made these devices and
the data acquired by them vulnerable to any kind of attacks.
Although the MPEG-21 standard has been adopted for
delivery of multimedia content, we argue that it can be used
in our architecture in order to enhance users’ privacy and
to enhance security requirements that are applied in such
environments. Moreover, since the medical measurements
that taken from patients’ EMDs can include diﬀerent data
types, besides raw data, like, for example, a snapshot of
electrocardiograph data in a jpeg ﬁle, or a video ﬁle of
electrocardiograph data, the MPEG-21 standard can help
us in content delivery, with security enhancement toward
diﬀerenttypes of end-users.Ourendeavor demonstrates that
no general-purpose home server is required for processing
medical data before sent toward end-users, that is, doctors,
medical staﬀ, thus making the proposed architecture a
good candidate for portable devices in pervasive healthcare
environments exposing limited resources.
We strongly believe that the outcome of this work
contributes toward the establishment of a standard context-
aware security environment in which parts of sensitive
personal information can be viewed only by valid users
even though many users can have access to them. The
main characteristics of our approach, which directly aﬀects
medical safety and treatment eﬃcacy, comprise standard-
ization, minimalizm, and sophistication. Ultimately, aﬀects
reduction of total health care cost, thus leading to a better
utilization of limited healthcare resources.
More speciﬁcally, Section 2 gives a presentation of the
relevant work, while Section 3 analyzes the emerging of
EMDs security requirements in combination with MPEG-
21 standard. Section 4 describes our proposed architecture
and Section 5 provides the conclusions and the future work
projection.
2. Related Work
Gialelis et al. [1] propose a pervasive healthcare architecture
into which a wearable health monitoring system is integrated
into a broad telemedical infrastructure allowing high-risk
cardiovascular patients to closely monitor changes in their
critical vital signs and get experts feedback to help maintain
optimal health status. Consistent with the major challenge to
provide good quality and reliable health care services to an
increasing number of people utilizing limited ﬁnancial and
human resources, they propose a person-based health care
system which consists of wearable Commercial of-the-shelf
nodes which are already used in the hospital environment,
andtheyarecapableofsensingandprocessingblood-oxygen,
blood-pressure, ECGs, and other vital signs and can be
seamlessly integrated into wireless personal area networks
(WPANs)forubiquitousreal-timepatientmonitoring.Their
architecturelackssafety,security,andprivacyconsiderations,
which may lead to serious breaches to architecture’s and
EMDs functionalities or to users’ privacy.
Venkatasubramanian and Gupta [2]m a d eas u r v e yo n
security solutions for pervasive healthcare environments
focusing on securing of data collected by EMDs, securing
the communications between EMDs and investigation of
mechanisms for controlling the access to medical data. They
propose the use of cryptographic primitives, where mea-
surements of physiological values are used for cryptographic
keys, eliminating thus the necessity for key distribution,
for securing data, and for the establishment of secure
communicationsbetweentwoentities.Concerningtheaccess
control to medical data, they survey methods that are based
on role-based access control (RBAC), extending it for usage
in pervasive healthcare environments.
As far as we know, the only proposal for usage of MPEG-
21 as a mechanism to access control to medical records
has been proposed by Brox [3]. The author links patients
records into MPEG-21 digital items and attempts to ﬁnd
access control mechanisms based on MPEG-21 standard. In
this work, the author does not provide a clear architecture
that implements the usage of MPEG-21 and also he does
notusetheMPEG-21IntellectualPropertyManagementand
Protection(IPMP)componentsfortheprotectionofmedical
records, but he mentions its use as a future and open research
issue.
3. Security Requirements—Threat Model
The primary function of a pervasive healthcare architecture
is to collect, to process, and to store medical data from
diﬀerent types of EMDs, which are located on the patient,
locally into general-purpose computing devices—for further
handling or to remote-located servers. In order to identify
the security mechanisms that should be deployed into
the proposed architecture for pervasive healthcare with
the utilization of EMDs, we must identify and classify
(i) possible attackers and malicious users of the afore-
mentioned environment; (ii) safety, security, and privacy
requirements.International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications 3
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Figure 1: A schematic structure of an MPEG-21 digital item.
Halperin et al. [4] provide a short classiﬁcation of
possible malicious users and adversaries in a pervasive
healthcare environment, identifying
(i) active adversaries which are malicious users that have
explicit interference and physical access to an EMD
(i.e., launching probing attacks, tampering attacks),
(ii) passive adversaries which are malicious users that
have implicit interference with an EMD, through
eavesdropping the communication link between an
EMD and another system or through side-channel
attacks,
(iii) insiders which comprise the most probable adver-
saries in such environments. Such attackers include
healthcare personnel, nurses, doctors, IT profession-
als, and even the patients themselves.
Security is a general requirement in modern computing
environments, but in pervasive healthcare systems security
is an imperative requirement because those systems handle
very sensitive data like medical data and electronic personal
records (EPRs). In order to identify the security aspects
and requirements in such environments, we have to identify
the threat model; some of the most signiﬁcant threats for
pervasive healthcare environments are (a) nonauthorized
access to patient’s medical data, that is, a nurse and a doctor
must have diﬀerent authorities and access control to medical
data; (b) intentional alteration of medical data, thus leading
to incorrect diagnosis and patient’s treatment; (c) disclosure
o fm e d i c a ld a t at ot h i r dp a r t i e s(e.g., to insurance companies
or any third parties that may use such records to gain proﬁt),
aiming to increase their revenue. In their work, Halperin et
al.[4],also,describeagenericframeworkforanalysis,design,
and evaluation of security and privacy issues in implantable
medical devices (IMDs). Although our architecture does
not contain any type of IMDs, a subset of the security
and safety goals that they describe in their work applies
to us, also. They identify two directions, one concerning
safety and utilization goals and the other concerning security
and privacy goals, and furthermore they are trying to
ﬁnd tradeoﬀs and tensions between those directions. Safety
and utility goals are traditional requirements in pervasive
healthcare systems, involving some security aspects. Such
goals are (a) accessibility to medical data, that is, ensuring
that only appropriate entities must have access to EMDs
and their medical data; (b) accuracy of measurements and
data, that is, all data and measurements taken from the
EMD must be accurate; (c) traceability and identiﬁcation of
EMDs, that is, an EMD must have mechanisms that allow it
to make its presence clear to authorized entities, whenever
it is necessary; (d) maintenance and reconﬁgurability, that
is, authorized personnel may alter EMDs conﬁguration,
locally or remotely; ﬁnally, (e) resources eﬃciency, that is,
extend EMDs battery life, through minimization of power
consumption. Besides safety and utility goals, due to their
nature, the modern pervasive healthcare environments have
also to fulﬁll some security- and privacy-related goals and
requirements. Those goals are not diﬀerent from traditional
security requirements of computing systems that basically
rely on the attainment of authentication and authorization,
dataconﬁdentiality,dataintegrity,availabilityandprotection
o fu s e r s ’p r i v a c y ,a n dh a v et ob ee x t e n d e da n dp o s s i b l y
reviewed in the context of pervasive healthcare environ-
ments. Authentication. Refers to methods and mechanisms
which allow to an entity to prove to a remote end its
identity, that is, in a transaction between two end-users over
a possibly unsafe communication network, there must be
mechanisms that assure that each part can be authenticated
by a remote end. Authorization, Refers to access control
mechanisms and to the ability of an entity to access shared
resources. Two basic subcategories of authorization can be
distinguished (a) personal authorization, that is, speciﬁc
people or groups of people may access patients’ data and
perform speciﬁc action over it; (b) role-based authorization,
that is, a person may have access to medical data based
on a speciﬁc role that he has, for example, a doctor, a
n u r s e ,ac a r e g i v e r .Data integrity. Mechanisms ensure that
when there is an interchange of data between two peer
entities, the received data and the original ones are the
same, and that no intermediate alteration has occurred,
for example, through interference of an eavesdropper. In
a typical pervasive healthcare system, various messages
and data are interchanged between diﬀerent participating
entities, so the integrity of the transmitted messages and
data is a basic requirement. Data conﬁdentiality,I ta s s u r e s
that stored or transmitted data are well protected from
possible disclosure. A mean to achieve data conﬁdentiality
is through cryptographic mechanisms. Availability. It is a
security requirement which implies that a malicious user
may not be able to passively or actively perform a denial-
of-service attack to an EMD, for example, battery attack,
memory overﬂow, jam the communication interface [5],
thus preventing it from operating normal and smoothly.
Privacy, It can be deﬁned as an entity’s ability to control how,
when, and to what extent personal information about the
entity will be communicated to third parties [6]. Anderson
[7] deﬁnes privacy as the secrecy for the beneﬁt of an
individual entity, where secrecy refers to generic mechanisms
that do not allow unauthorized usage and access of data
and resources. Extending privacy in the context of pervasive
healthcare environments, we refer to (i) EMD-existence and
EMD-type privacy, that is, an EMD should not make its4 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
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ipmpdidl : IPMPInfoDescriptor
Figure 2: Structure of an IPMP DIDL element.
presence and its type clear to an unauthorized party, since
the user (patient) might not want to know nonauthorized
users what type of EMD they carry with them and what type
of functions it serves.
Our proposed architecture addresses authentication and
authorization issues, since each user has a license that deﬁnes
what he/she has access to. Moreover, data conﬁdentiality
is achieved through cryptographic mechanisms, that is,
sensitive data are encrypted and data integrity is achieved
transparently by the doctor’s devices that have access to the
data. Finally, the utilization of a DRM mechanism through
the MPEG-21 framework helps in the protection of user’s
privacy, that is, diﬀerent groups of users have access to
diﬀerent types of medical data.
3.1. MPEG-21 Standard. MPEG-21 is a new standard which
has been proposed for primary use in the context of
multimedia world, allowing the seamless, transparent, and
universal delivery of multimedia content to the end-user,
thus solving any interoperability issues. The core notion
into the standard is the digital item (DI) that represents the
digital asset (e.g., a movie, an audio track, or other data),
and which contains the digital content and other related
metadata (e.g., creator’s details, usage rules and terms,
licenses, security related information); the DI hierarchy is
represented in Digital Item Declaration Language (DIDL)
which is an XML-based document [8]. In the digital item
hierarchy, see Figure 1, we identify (i) resources which are the
individual multimedia data, that is, a picture, audio or video
data, or any other data; (ii) components which are collection
of resources with their descriptors. A component by itself
is not an item, but the components are the basic building
blocks of items, and (iii) descriptors which are metadata that
accompany a resource, containing information that concerns
all or part of the speciﬁc resource. Also, a container is a
structure which comprises of items and containers, forming
thus logical packages for interexchanges between entities.
3.2. MPEG-21 IPMP. The security problems may arise
from the fact that the digital item’s description, that is, its
structure, contents, attributes, and metadata, is a clear XML
document and it is easily visible to anyone and vulnerable
to nonauthorized usage. Due to that fact, the MPEG-21
includes a part named Intellectual Property Management
and Protection (IPMP) which provide mechanisms for
protection of digital item. More speciﬁcally, MPEG-21 IPMP
in conjunction with the MPEG-REL Rights Expression
Language (REL) provide a framework that enables all users
in the digital contents delivery chain to express their rights
and interests in digital items and to have the assurance that
those rights and interests will be persistently and reliably
managed and protected across a wide range of networks and
devices [9] .T h ec o r en o t i o ni nM P E G - 2 1I P M Pi sr e l a t e d
with the IPMP tools that are used to protect the digital item.
Those tools are not predescribed by the standard, but each
user, vendor, and so forth, may deﬁne and implement his
own set of tools which perform basic security functions like
encryption/decryption algorithms, authentication and data
integrity mechanisms, watermarking, and ﬁngerprinting.
With the use of MPEG-21 IPMP components, we may
protectthewholeDIorapartofitthroughtheencapsulation
of the original DIDL elements that we want to protect,
with additional information (IPMP Info) that refer to
mechanisms and tools for the protection of the original
elements. MPEG-21 IPMP deﬁnes a new set of IPMP DIDL
elements which have the same role and semantics as an
element deﬁned in DIDL. The structure of an IPMP DIDL
element can be seen in Figure 2.
The ipmpdidl : info element contains information about
protection and usage rules of the digital content, which may
be categorized to (i) information about protection of the
whole digital item, which is included in the child element
ipmpdidl : IPMPGeneralInfoDescriptor and (ii) information
about protection of a certain part of the digital item’s
hierarchy, which is included in the child element ipmpdidl :
IPMPInfoDescriptor,s e eFigure 2. Both prementioned child
elements have two purposes of existence (a) to describe
the tools that are used for digital items protection, and (b)
to provide a set of licenses that accompany the content
and deﬁne its usage rules. More speciﬁcally, the ipmpdidl :
IPMPInfoDescriptor element contains the following child
elements (see Figure 3): (a) the ipmpinfo : Tool child element
which is used to specify a tool (or tools) that protect the
speciﬁedpartoftheDI’shierarchy.EachtoolhasauniqueID
andmaybeeitherreferenced,ifitislocatedinaremoteIPMP
tools server or it may be included in line to the digital item
(in the latter case, the base-64 encoded version of the tool is
included); (b) the ipmpinfo : RightsDescriptor child element
which contains the licenses that governthe usageof contents.
Part 5 of MPEG-21 standard [10] deﬁnes the MPEG Rights
Expression Language (REL) which a language that is used
to create licenses that express usage rules and rights set
by the creators of the digital items, regarding actions over
them. Moreover, the license can be used to convey some
other sensitive data, like, for example, decryption keys
for the encrypted (protected) contents of the digital item.International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications 5
ipmpdidl : IPMPInfoDescriptor
ipmpinfo : tool
ipmpinfo : RightsDescriptor
Figure 3: Schematic view of the structure of the ipmpdidl : IPMPInfoDescriptor element.
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Figure 4: A high-level view of the proposed architecture.
T h eM P E G - R E Ld e ﬁ n e st h eencryptedLicense element which
contains the license’s contents in an encrypted form and it is
used when the issuer wants to keep the content of the license
conﬁdential. When decrypted, the original license’s contents
are unveiled.
The child element ipmpdidl : contents contains the
protected digital asset itself which has been protected with a
setoftools(e.g.,cryptographictools,watermarking,hashing,
digital signatures) that have been described in the child
element ipmpdidl : info.
4. Proposed Architecture
In the high-level view of the proposed architecture as
depicted in Figure 4, we can identify the user at home,
equipped with diﬀerent portable EMDs that transmit their
measurements into a PDA which aggregates them for
temporal storage and further processing (creation of encap-
sulated MPEG-21 IPMP-protected metadata ﬁle). Then, the
generated ﬁle is sent to a data server which is located at
the patient’s hospital and it is stored to a database. If it is
necessary, the patient’s doctor may extract data from that
ﬁle remotely through his PDA device, acting and informing
accordingly the patient.
More speciﬁcally, Tier 1 encompasses a number of
portable EMDs equipped with the corresponding sensors,
easy to handle and maintain, which are integrated into a
wireless wearable personal area network (WWPAN). Each
of them can acquire, sample, and process one or more
physiological parameters. More speciﬁcally, a small (5cm ×
5cm) portable electrocardiogram device is utilized for the
heart activity monitoring by providing a full 12-lead ECG
by collecting signals through ten sensors and electrodes
with ﬁxed position. The ten input channels (VLA, VRA,
VLL, VRL, V1-V6) are sampled at 500Hz with a 10-bit
resolution analog to digital (A/D) converter. A small (watch
size) portable wrist (and arm if chosen) blood pressure
device is utilized for monitoring patient’s blood pressure
upon request. Oxygen saturation is monitored through a
small (2cm × 2cm) portable device which its sensor ﬁts to
one of patient’s ﬁgures. Pulse rate is also measured either
from the portable wrist or the ECG device.
Tier2encompassesapersonalserverapplicationrunning
on a personal digital assistant, a cellular phone, a laptop,
or a home PC. The personal server undertakes a number
of tasks such as a transparent interface to the WWPAN
(portable devices), an interface to the user and an interface
to Tier 3 (Medical Server & Thin Client). The interface
to the WWPAN comprises network conﬁguration and
management tasks. The network conﬁguration task, among
other functions, supports device and sensor registration and
initialization, customization, and network communication6 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
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Figure 5: A sequence diagram of ﬂow of medical data measurements from patient’s home toward the data server which is located at the
patient’s hospital.
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Figure 6: Abstract view of MPEG-21 digital item that presents a
snapshot of EMDs measurements for a speciﬁc patient.
setup. After the network is conﬁgured, the personal server
application is initiated in order to manage the network, that
is, channel and time synchronization, data acquisition, data
processing, data fusion, and so forth. Furthermore, upon the
availability of a communication channel, the personal server
establishes a secure link toward Tier 3 and transmits reports
or ﬁles which are being further processed and integrated
in the patient’s health record. In case the availability of a
communication channel is not possible, the personal server
stores the data locally until the channel becomes available.
Tier 3 comprises the Medical Server which, actually,
encompasses other servers such as emergency server, health-
care server, medical records server, mail server, and the
“thin-client” used for remote accessing of Medical Server
applications utilizing a “visualization” applet under secure
link.
The Medical Server runs a large diversity of appli-
cations comprising setting up communication channel to
personal servers, collecting users’ reports, integrating data
into patients’ medical records data bases, processing medical
records upon authorized doctors and/or specialized person-
nel demand, processing patients messages and other critical
applications.
As soon as the medical data measurements are collected
by the EMDs, they are sent toward the PDA (Tier 2) which
is responsible for the creation of the MPEG-21-protected
container that contains the medical measurements with
appropriate usage licenses, as it can be seen in Figure 5.
In steps 1–4, medical data measurements from diﬀer-
ent user-located EMDs (ECG, blood pressure and oxygen
saturation, and pulse rate) are taken and sent toward the
PDA, which in turn, aggregates them and creates an initial
packaged data ﬁle that contains the previous data measure-
ments. Afterwards, the packaged ﬁle is amended to further
processing in order to be “encoded” according to MPEG-21
terms, with appropriate metadata, protection information,
and patient’s instructions (relevant usage licenses) (step 5).
Then, the new MPEG-21-based packaged ﬁle is sent to the
hospital’s servers for further handling, that is, storage in data
servers,andinformingphysiciansanddoctorsaboutpatient’s
situation (step 6).
In the following ﬁgures, we depict an abstract view of an
MPEG-21 digital item that contains EMDs measurements,
Figure 6, and the schematic encapsulation of them into an
IPMP container, see Figure 7.A sw eh a v es t a t e db e f o r e ,
the MPEG-21-based encapsulation of data protects it from
unauthorized view and possible malicious usage.
In Section 4, we have emphasized that in such pervasive
healthcare environments the protection of patient’s privacy
and medical data conﬁdentiality are key issues. So when
the MPEG-21-based packaged ﬁle comes to the hospital, its
structure and its contents should not be fully accessible to
nonappropriate users. We identify three groups of people
that should have diﬀerent access rights to the protected
contents (i) the IT supervisors which are responsible for
storing the received packaged ﬁles to databases, (b) theInternational Journal of Telemedicine and Applications 7
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Figure 8:Aschematicviewoftheencapsulatedmedicaldataintoan
MPEG-21 container. The ﬁrst item is not protected, and it contains
some data which can be used by the IT personnel in order to store
the protected ﬁle into appropriate databases. The second item is
protected,anditcontainssomepartofpersonaldataforthepatient.
Finally, the last item is also protected and includes the detailed
medical data measurements. Each item is encrypted using diﬀerent
encryption keys, so each item can be seen only by users that possess
the appropriate key for decryption.
specialized medical personnel like, for example, the nurses,
and (c) the doctors, who are responsible for the attendance
of the patients. Each of these groups must have diﬀerent
access rights to protected digital contents. For example, the
IT stuﬀ may just see the patient’s identiﬁcation number,
(patID), which is unique for each patient, in order to
store the packaged ﬁle in data server and update patient’s
electronic record. On the other hand, a nurse or trained
medical stuﬀ must be able to see some details about the
patient, for example, a part of patients’ personal data like
surname, name, and maybe an initial diagnosis, which
may have automatically taken part at patient’s home after
the occurrences of data measurements, in order to inform
the patient’s doctor for further handling of the patient’s
situation. Finally, the patient’s doctor may have full access
to contents of MPEG-21-packaged ﬁles, that is, patients
personal data, detailed medical data measurements taken
by EMDs, time of measurements, and initial automated
diagnosis. So the generated MPEG-21 container contains
three diﬀerent items; the ﬁrst item is unprotected and
contains a text data ﬁle with the patient’s identiﬁcation
number,whichcanbeusedforstorageoftheﬁletoadatabase
for further handling, and some other data, like the time
that the ﬁle was created at the user’s PDA. The other two
items are protected with the MPEG-21 IPMP components
and are indented for use by the trained medical staﬀ and
the doctors, containing appropriate data. Each of these items
contains a license of usage, in an encrypted form, which
grants access to contents of ﬁle to speciﬁc user. The license
also contains the key which has been used from the patient’s
PDA for the encryption of the medical data ﬁle. We assume
thateachpatientandeachofthedoctorsandtrainedmedical
staﬀ have a prearranged set of public-private keys; those key
pairs are assigned by the main hospital’s server and can be
revoked at any time since there is continuous communica-
tion between the hospital’s server and the patient’s (home)
server. So the license for data usage can be encrypted using
the public key of the entity with which it is related, for
example, the doctor with whom the patient is related. In
order to access the protected items’ contents, the end-user
must decrypt the license with his private key, retrieve the
decryption key from the license, and decrypt the encrypted
contents.
Following, in Figure 8, we depict a schematic view
of the encapsulated MPEG-21-based data ﬁle which is
transmitted from patient’s home server toward hospital data
servers.8 International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications
<DIDL xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" 
  xmlns:dii="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS" 
  xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS" 
  xmlns:ipmpdidl="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2004:01-IPMPDIDL-NS" 
  xmlns:ipmpinfo="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2004:01-IPMPINFO-NS" 
  xmlns:dip="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-DIP-NS">
     <Container>
 <Item>
 <Descriptor id = "item_1">
 <Statement  mimeType="text/plain">Patient's Identification Data</Statement>
 </Descriptor>
 <Component>
                 <Resource xmlns:ns1="urn:example:01" mimeType="text/plain" ns1:localPath="patientID.txt"
   encoding="base64">cGF0aWVudCdzIElEIGlzOiBwYXRJRA0KDQpUaW1lIG9mIGRhdGEgZmlsZSBjcmVhdGlvbiBpczo
  gMjAwOC0wNC0xMlQyMzozNjo1Mg==</Resource>
 </Component>
 </Item>
 <ipmpdidl:Item>
                   <ipmpdidl:Identifier>
            <ax:ObjectIdentification xmlns:ax="urn:axmedis:01">
                            <dii:Identifier>urn:axmedis:00000:obj:d8c8e292-5d15-4cd9-b19b-71a98ba14b7e</dii:Identifier>
            </ax:ObjectIdentification>
                    </ipmpdidl:Identifier>
                   <ipmpdidl:Info>
           <ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
                            <ipmpinfo:Tool>
                    <ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
    < i pmpinfo:IPMPToolID>
                          urn:axmedis:ipmp:tool:id:0008
    < / i pmpinfo:IPMPToolID>
                    </ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
                    <ipmpinfo:Remote ref="urn:IPMP_Tools:ToolServer:ToolSymEnc08"/>
                           </ipmpinfo:Tool>
         </ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
                   </ipmpdidl:Info>
                   <ipmpinfo:RightsDescriptor>
           <ipmpinfo:License>
                           <r:license>
                    <r:encryptedLicense
                    Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
            <enc:EncryptionMethod
            A l gorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa1_5"/>
                              <dsig:KeyInfo>
                    <dsig:KeyName>asymmetricKey</dsig:KeyName>
                              </dsig:KeyInfo>
                              <enc:CipherData>
                    <enc:CipherValue>
                                    Ktd63SDfkDWEoQ...
                    </enc:CipherValue>
                              </enc:CipherData>
                    </r:encryptedLicense>
                           </r:license>
           </ipmpinfo:License>
                   </ipmpinfo:RightsDescriptor>
                   <ipmpdidl:Contents>maObDtRqBAgm+9MshKHJZ+UBFO9XS7L3a2yU31h0/N19M/
                   4rU1Lj412BGmaKQgJDvf2eiPD7sbm73ueNPSHZqNrmzztYIX/0I9J6YA3gYWX10PLrauA//
                   41P4QO7yDGikRSkmiaeylc4YWmA9rwXIKc4nonLzrUNyGCPu7+qtvk06T2c+qaGkZkiL52j+At3EANCa+1g1/7skX2BwJZ8s..... </
                    ipmpdidl:Contents>
 </ipmpdidl:Item>
 <ipmpdidl:Item>
                   <ipmpdidl:Identifier>
             <ax:ObjectIdentification xmlns:ax="urn:axmedis:01">
   <dii:Identifier>urn:axmedis:00000:obj:53d99252-d4ae-4bfd-8994-cab444514d88</dii:Identifier>
             </ax:ObjectIdentification>
                   <ipmpdidl:Info>
             <ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
   < i pmpinfo:Tool>
                        <ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
                 <ipmpinfo:IPMPToolID>
     u rn:axmedis:ipmp:tool:id:0008
                                          </ipmpinfo:IPMPToolID>
                         </ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
                         <ipmpinfo:Remote ref="urn:IPMP_Tools:ToolServer:ToolSymEnc08"/>
     </ipmpinfo:Tool>
              </ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
                     </ipmpdidl:Info>
                     <ipmpinfo:RightsDescriptor>
              <ipmpinfo:License>
   < r:license>
                       <r:encryptedLicense
                       Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
             <enc:EncryptionMethod
             Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa1_5"/>
                              t<dsig:KeyInfo>
                     <dsig:KeyName>asymmetricKey</dsig:KeyName>
                              </dsig:KeyInfo>
                              <enc:CipherData>
                     <enc:CipherValue>
        gyTE96639In0FZFY2/rMJ01EArmKZsR5VW3rwoPxw...
                     </enc:CipherValue>
                              </enc:CipherData>
                      </r:encryptedLicense>
   < / r:license>
              </ipmpinfo:License>
                     </ipmpinfo:RightsDescriptor>
                     <ipmpdidl:Contents>5UTBn6qHURmHMv3U5D9KB55HzJcTfIrAlrfxPVB/
                     7DPDRPxg9XJsM9Dhezrkp2na6LTqOESjGmIeIzrtVYlT255V/
                     TilLtxbqwPt+pPhCfa+q7DQ1mB7Yx0kiszJiTUT0oEmnlq+QhnkG+xrVNub9l6AL7euIFI8Ch2sAX/
                     29ZhATZmDOh0aO0cMjxWFN9nPLccGQz0ZAvbsEm0b7KT+dBKmS08GGW6AIMjskk. . . . . . . . .
                     </ipmpdidl:Contents>
 </ipmpdidl:Item>
      </Container>
</DIDL>
Figure 9: An example view of an MPEG-21 IPMP container which contains three items—one not protected and two protected with the
use of a cryptographic tool that is remote referenced at the location urn:IPMP Tools:ToolServer:ToolSymEnc08. Before the user decrypts
the contents, he must decrypt the license that accompanies the content, which will provide to the user the decryption key and usage rules
of the content. The license is binded to a speciﬁc user and it is included into the item encrypted using a public-key algorithm; in our
implementation, we used RSA [11], and the license has been encrypted using the users’ public key. For the creation of the aforementioned
MPEG-21 IPMP-based ﬁle, we have used the AXMEDIS editor [12].International Journal of Telemedicine and Applications 9
Finally, in Figure 9, we present an XML-view of the
MPEG-21 IPMP-protected container that contains the three
prementioned items. The contents of each item are protected
(encrypted) with the use of a tool that implements a
speciﬁc symmetric cryptographic algorithm, and it is remote
referenced into the digital items’ description. Even if one
malicious user has access to the remote location of the
tool,heneeds somecryptographicsensitive informationlike,
for example, a decryption key for decoding the protected
contents; the key for the decryption is included into the
encrypted license that accompanies each item, which fur-
thermore deﬁnes the usage rules of the contents. Each item
contains some information that identiﬁes the user for whom
this item is destined, that is, item 1 has to be processed by
the IT stuﬀ, item 2 has to be taken care by a nurse, and
so forth. After the reception of each item, each relevant
user initiates the procedure which will decrypt his/her
license—with the use of his private key and then he/she will
decrypttheprotectedcontents—withthesymmetrickeythat
is embedded into his/her license, thus revealing the original
packaged medical information.
5. Conclusions
Westronglybelievethattheoutcomeofthisworkcontributes
toward the establishment of a standard security environment
in which parts of sensitive personal information can be
viewed only by valid users even though many users can have
access to them. The main characteristics of our approach,
which directly aﬀect medical safety and treatment eﬃcacy,
comprise standardization, minimalizm, and sophistication.
Ultimately, aﬀects reduction of total health care cost, thus
leading to a better utilization of limited healthcare resources.
Moreover, our endeavor demonstrates that no general-
purpose home server is required for processing of medical
data before sent toward end-users, that is, doctors, medical
staﬀ, thus making the proposed architecture a good candi-
date for portable devices in pervasive healthcare environ-
mentsexposinglimitedresources.Inourproposal,weusethe
MPEG-21 standards’ IPMP components in order to enhance
users’ privacy and achieve security requirements that are
applied in such environments. To our knowledge, there is no
other security framework compliant with MPEG-21 that has
been applied to protect such content, thus no comparison
with other similar frameworks is provided. As a matter
of fact, this aspect constitutes a future research activity.
Furthermore, with respect to future work, we are planning
to exploit some other elements of the MPEG-21 standard
which, for example, would allow us to include (in line) into
the IPMP-protected digital item the protection tools that
are used to govern the protected item rather than remote
referenced them, and also we could use some other elements
of MPEG-21 IPMP that allow digitally authentication of the
protection tools, that is, each tool carries a digital signature
which validated each time the tool is used, before appliance
of them to the protected contents. A lot of our research work
is taken place investigating issues that are related with the
security of our architecture under known attacks. Moreover,
as the MPEG-21 is a quite new open standard that can be
used for protection of sensitive data with the use of DRM,
as a future work, we are investigating the identiﬁcation of
possible leaks and vulnerabilities of the standard, that may
lead to attacks and a compromised system. We are also
investigating issues that are related with the safe destruction
ofthemedicaldataaftertheirviewing;inthatcontext,theuse
of trusted platform architectures [13]c o u l db ead i r e c t i o n
that will lead to a solution. At this time, we assume that the
hospital’s server is a trusted one, and that the devices on
which those data are viewed are also safe and trusted, and
that there is no possibility for data storage or alteration.
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